Introduction
In most constitutional democracies, political disputes or contestations will likely end up in the courts. When this happens, the principles of judicial independence and separation of powers are threatened. As one South African judge recently warned in Mazibuko v Sisulu 1 there is a threat to judicial independence when the judiciary is drawn in to resolve political questions that are beyond its competence or jurisdiction.
2 He further said:
An overreach of the powers of judges, their intrusion into issues which are beyond their competence or intended jurisdiction or which have been deliberately and carefully constructed legally so as to ensure that the other arms of the state deal with these matters, can only result in jeopardy for our constitutional democracy. In this dispute I am not prepared to create a juristocracy and thus do more than that which I am mandated to do in terms of our constitutional model.
3
The difficulty that confronts democracies is how to jurisprudentially resolve political questions that end up in the courts while at the same time preserving the separation of powers. In some democracies, notably Nigeria, Uganda, Ghana, United States and Israel, judiciaries have developed what is commonly referred to as the political question doctrine to jurisprudentially resolve political questions and define their relationship with other branches of government. The political question doctrine is a function of the principle of the separation of powers, and it provides that there are certain questions of constitutional law that are constitutionally committed to the elected branches of government for resolution. 4 As a result, such questions are nonjusticiable and require the judiciary to abstain from deciding them if doing so would intrude upon the functions of the elected branches of government. 5 The underlying theme is that such questions must find resolution in the political process.
6
This article examines the development and current status of the theme of the political question doctrine in Ghanaian jurisprudence, which was developed from American jurisprudence. It begins by briefly discussing the history of the political question doctrine and its modern application in the United States of America. It then discusses the application of the political question doctrine in Ghana. It argues that while there are differences of opinion around the application of the political question doctrine, the doctrine is firmly part of Ghanaian constitutional law. It observes that the differences of opinion among judges in Ghana is over the proper application of the doctrine rather than whether or not it forms part of Ghanaian constitutional law.
The article also discusses another related issue, which is the constitutional status of Directive Principles of State Policy in chapter 6 of the Constitution of Ghana and whether or not these principles are justiciable. Constitution's separation of powers, is to ensure proper judicial restraint against exercising jurisdiction when doing so would require courts to assume responsibilities which are assigned to the political branches. The second purpose is to ensure the legitimacy of the judiciary by on the powers of the political branches of government. 7 In addition, Marbury is prominently known for holding that "… it is, emphatically, the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is". 8 With this holding Marbury laid the foundation for the exercise of judicial review in modern democracies across the globe. While the holding in Marbury is famously known to have claimed the power of judicial review, it also recognized limitations on that power and said:
The province of the court is, solely, to decide on the rights of individuals, not to inquire how the executive, or executive officers, perform duties in which they have discretion. Questions in their nature political, or which are, by the constitution and laws, submitted to the executive, can never be made in this court.
9
With this pronouncement the court in Marbury instructed the judiciary to dismiss cases if the constitution's text, structure, or theory signified that an issue should be decided by an elected branch of government.
10 Based on this articulation, Marbury recognized a clear distinction between legal questions that the judiciary must decide and political questions they must allow the political branches to remedy. 11 As Fallon has commented, Marbury not only represents the fountainhead of judicial review, but also "... furnishes the canonical statement of the necessary and appropriate role of the judiciary in the constitutional system founded on the principle of separation of powers". 12 It is for this reason that some commentators have defended the political question doctrine on the grounds of the separation of powers, arguing that a Constitution should be viewed as assigning responsibility for interpreting or enforcing certain constitutional provisions to the elected branches of government.
13
Since Marbury, the Supreme Court has applied the political question doctrine in a number of cases. Constitution was not a political question. 16 Justice Brennan, who wrote for the majority in Baker v Carr, announced six criteria for assessing when a case may be dismissed under the political question doctrine. 17 These criteria are:
[1] textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department; [2] or a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standard for resolving it; [3] or the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for non-judicial discretion; [4] or the impossibility of a court's undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of government; [5] or an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made; [6] or the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one question.
18
According to Justice Brennan, the existence of one criterion is sufficient to invoke the political question doctrine. Schneider v Kissinger 412 F 3d 190 (2005) (where the Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court's decision to dismiss on the grounds that the claims involved non-justiciable political questions. In addressing concern about the effects of leaving political questions to the political process, the court reasoned that the lack of judicial authority to oversee the conduct of the executive branch in political matters did not leave executive power unchecked because political branches effectively exercise checks and balances on each other in the area of political Justice Kpegah goes on to explain that while the Constitution of Ghana is expressed as the supreme law of Ghana, there is an inherent indication in the text that the policy which informs or should inform any legislation and the desire to enact such legislation are matters for the political branches of government to determine. 44 On the other hand, Kpegah concedes that the interpretation and enforcement of the law passed by the legislature fall within the functions of the judiciary. In his view, the question of whether an Act of parliament is constitutionally valid or not is not a political question and the judiciary is not barred from deciding it. 45 He teaches us that when the judiciary examines whether parliament has breached the constitutional limits on its legislative powers it is not engaging in determining political questions, because judiciaries have the power to make these determinations. For Kpegah, this distinction is important and must be maintained.
46
One of Kpegah's colleagues on the bench, Chief Justice Archer, agreed with the importance of maintaining this distinction when he said:
The Constitution gives the judiciary power to interpret and enforce the Constitution and I do not think that this independence enables the judiciary to do what it likes by undertaking incursions into territory reserved for Parliament and the executive. This court should not behave like an octopus stretching its eight tentacles here and there to grab jurisdiction not constitutionally meant for it. I hold that this court has no constitutional power to prevent the executive from proclaiming 31 December as a public holiday. Justice Ngcobo agrees with the need to maintain this distinction and explains that "when a court decides whether parliament has complied with its express constitutional obligation, such as a provision that requires statutes to be passed by a specified majority, it does not infringe upon the principle of separation of powers or determine a political question". a necessary function of the universal principle of separation of powers. 49 There are at least three Supreme Court decisions and one high court decision that either openly applied or considered the political question doctrine in post-1992 Ghana.
Upholding a legislative decision to declare a public holiday as a political question
The first case that considered the political question doctrine was New Patriotic Party v Attorney-General (31 December Case). It was said that the issue is a political one that the plaintiff ought to have made its complaint to Parliament. However, there is nothing to stop it from making a legal issue of it and coming to this court for redress. As the fundamental law, the Constitution controls all legislation and determines their validity. It is for the courts to ensure that all agencies of the state keep within their lawful bounds. Bamford-Addo reasoned that "... the fixing of 31 December as a public holiday was not offensive to the Constitution but a policy choice". 56 According to Justice Bamford-Addo, any government has the freedom to adopt a policy choice, through legislation, to scrap or insert 31 December from the list of public holidays in the legislation. 57 Thus, since the fixing of 31 December was a policy choice, the minority view was that the political question doctrine barred the Supreme Court from deciding the matter as a means of demonstrating respect to the other arms of government.
In his support of the minority views, Justice Archer defended the theme of the political question doctrine and reasoned that:
I think if the order is granted, it would amount to judicial officiousness -poking our noses into the affairs of Parliament and intermeddling with the prerogative of the executive by directing the government not to spend moneys approved by Parliament. Such a move clearly amounts to a violation of the doctrine of separation of powers which is the core of our Constitution.
58
It is important to point out that while siding with the majority on the question of 31
December celebrations, Justice Hayfron-Benjamin differed from the majority on the broad question of whether the political question doctrine was applicable in Ghana.
Justice Hayfron-Benjamin confidently stated that:
The whole principle of a non-justiciable political question is an American formulation. While it may be relevant to our situation because it is a development from a written democratic Constitution, I think there are so few parallels between the two Constitutions on this principle that its application to our Constitution, 1992 must necessarily be limited. It seems to me therefore that by the nature of our Constitution the principle of a non-justiciable political question can only arise where the Constitution expressly commits a particular responsibility to some arm of government. A clear example may be the power of the President to appoint ambassadors under article 74 (1) 
Upholding the appointment of a Chief Justice as a political question
In Ghana Bar Association, the President acting under articles 91(1) 61 and 144 (1) In line with Barkow's thinking, the government's main argument in Ghana Bar
Association was that by virtue of the principle of separation of powers enshrined in the Constitution, the appointment of Justice Abban as Chief Justice was a nonjusticiable political question specifically committed to the President, Council of State and Parliament. On the contrary, the GBA argued that the Supreme Court, pursuant to articles 295 and 125(3) of the Constitution, has the final judicial power to determine whether any person or authority has properly performed his, her or its functions under the Constitution or any other law. As a result, the political question doctrine was not applicable to Ghana.
65
Justice Kpegah, who wrote for the majority, held that the political question doctrine was applicable to Ghana. He reasoned that the doctrine was implicit in the concept of the separation of powers, where certain functions are committed to a specific branch of government. In such a constitutional design, he reasoned, a political question cannot evolve into a judicial question. 66 In support of Justice Kpegah, Weinberg has argued that in "a system where government is composed of three coequal branches, the interpretation and enforcement of the constitutional law cannot be entrusted entirely to the judiciary or the elected branches" but must be understood as a shared responsibility. 67 To a great extent, this view is shared by Barkow. In her view, the political question doctrine "… reflects a constitutional design that does not require the judiciary to supply the substantive content of all constitutional provisions". 68 Consistent with these views, Justice Kpegah held that article 144 of the Constitution committed the appointment of the Chief Justice to the executive branch and legislative branch, and that any attempt by the Supreme Court to claim a power to be able to declare null and void the appointment of the Chief Justice would justly be described as a usurpation of the constitutional functions of both the executive and legislative branches. 69 Kpegah was convinced that by 65 Defenders of the political question doctrine oppose arguments like this one raised by the GBA, which presuppose that the judiciary has the final say on the interpretation of the Constitution. If by the political question doctrine, it is meant that where the Constitution allocates power or function to an authority, and that authority exercises that power within the parameters of that provision and the Constitution as a whole, a court has no jurisdiction to interfere with the exercise of that function, then I entirely agree that the doctrine applies in our constitutional jurisprudence. For this is what is implied in the concept of separation of powers. But if by the doctrine, it is meant that even when the authority exercises that power in violation of the constitutional provision, a court has no jurisdiction to interfere because it is the Constitution which allocated that power to that authority, then I emphatically disagree.
81
I believe Justice Acquah's statement above is a perfect expression of what Cowper and Sossin identified as the difficulty with the political question doctrine, which lies in the failure by some jurists to distinguish between "… questions which the judiciary must resolve, no matter how politically sensitive, and those that raise separation of powers concerns and should therefore be dismissed by the judiciary". 82 It is possible that I have given Justice Acquah an unfair reading, but I cannot help but believe that there is a failure to appreciate the significance of the above distinction in Justice Acquah's reasoning.
In explaining the distinction that must be made in cases involving political questions, Redish offered a useful suggestion which (while made in the American context during the 1980s) addresses Justice Acquah's assertion above. Redish postulates that in those cases that raise separation of powers concerns and should be dismissed, the "… judiciary does not abdicate its power to interpret and enforce the Constitution"; rather it simply holds "… that nothing in the Constitution directs the political branch as to how to exercise its constitutionally granted power". 83 Redish further maintains that "… when the Constitution's framers intended that one of the political branches has discretion to act, the text says so, by vesting decision making power in those branches without simultaneously indicating the parameters of that It seems to me therefore that a distinction should be drawn between constitutional provisions that impose obligations that are readily ascertainable and are unlikely to give rise to disputes, on the one hand, and those provisions which impose the primary obligation on Parliament to determine what is required of it, on the other. In the case of the former, a determination whether those obligations have been fulfilled does not call upon a court to pronounce upon a sensitive aspect of the separation of powers. It simply decides the formal question whether there was, for example, the two-thirds majority required to pass the legislation. By contrast, where the obligation requires Parliament to determine in the first place what is necessary to fulfil its obligation, a review by a court whether that obligation has been fulfilled, trenches on the autonomy of Parliament to regulate its own affairs and thus the principle of separation of powers. December Case, has been cited as authority in support for the application of the political question doctrine in Ghana. 95 In other words, by distinguishing Mensah v Attorney-General from Tuffuor, Justice Aikins' pronouncement can be read as bringing clarity in the law that the political question doctrine is applicable in Ghana. To best illustrate the suitability of applying the political question doctrine in this case, Justice Ayebi employed the following hypothetical scenario and said:
Upholding a legislative decision to retain a Member of Parliament as a political question
… suppose the member of Parliament in this case was involved in a fatal accident on this trip and he was only able to inform Mr. Speaker long after fifteen sittings of Parliament. Doctors attending to him determined that it will take some time for him to recover. Should the court declare an indefinite dispensation granted to such Member of Parliament in such circumstances by parliament as unreasonable? Consequent upon that, should the court declare the seat of the Member of Parliament vacant? I think not, he observed. the political question doctrine in the case. 103 Asare's criticism is reflective of the prevailing discourse around the doctrine in Ghana, namely that it forms part of Ghanaian law and Ghana Bar Association articulates how it ought to be applied.
Therefore it seems clear from this discourse that the critical views against the recent application of the political question doctrine are not dismissive of the doctrine but are rather directed at what should be its proper application.
The justiciability of directive policies and certain provisions of the Constitution
What is clear from the above analysis is that the application of the political question doctrine requires an acceptance that there are certain constitutional questions or provisions that are not justiciable. This is why the doctrine is controversial. However, the issue of the justiciability or not of certain provisions of the Constitution of Ghana has been contested since the advent of constitutionalism in Ghana. 104 As commentators have observed, one of the areas where this issue has come to the fore is chapter 6 of the Constitution. 105 In particular, commentators note that Article 34(1), the opening of chapter 6, creates some ambiguity. 106 The article provides that:
34 (1) The Directive Principles of State Policy contained in this Chapter shall guide all citizens, Parliament, the President, the Judiciary, the Council of State, the Cabinet, political parties and other bodies and persons in applying or interpreting this Constitution or any other law and in taking and implementing any policy decisions, for the establishment of a just and free society.
The observation from scholars is that the ambiguity arose from the Consultative these Directives Principles in chapter 6 was explained by the Committee of Experts as follows:
94. The NCD report speaks of the need to include in the new Constitution 'core principles around which national political, social and economic life will revolve.' This is precisely what the Directive Principles of State Policy seeks to do. Against the background of the achievements and failings of our postindependence experience, and our aspirations for the future as a people, the principles attempt to set the stage for the enunciation of political, civil, economic and social rights of our people. They may thus be regarded as spelling out in broad strokes the spirit or conscience of the constitution. The Committee used Chapter Four of the 1979 Constitution as a basis for its deliberations on this subject.
95. By tradition Directive Principles are not justiciable; even so, there are at least two good reasons for including them in a constitution. First, Directive Principles enumerate a set of fundamental objectives which a people expect all bodies and persons that make or execute public policy to strive to achieve. In the present proposals, one novelty is the explicit inclusion of political parties among the bodies expected to observe the principles. The reason for this is that political parties significantly influence government policy. A second justification for including Directive Principles in a constitution is that, taken together, they constitute, in the long run, a sort of barometer by which the people could measure the performance of their government. In effect they provide goals for legislative programmes and a guide for judicial interpretation.
96. On the basis of the foregoing considerations, the Committee proposes as follows: The Directive Principles of State Policy are for the guidance of Parliament, the President, the Council of Minister, Political Parties and other bodies and persons in making and applying public policy for the establishment of a just and free society. The Principles should not of and by themselves be legally enforceable by any Court. The Court should, however, have regard to the said Principles in interpreting any laws based on them.
108
According to some scholars, the problem is that the final text of the Constitution I do not subscribe to the view that chapter 6 of the Constitution is not justiciable: it is. First, the Constitution as a whole is a justiciable document. If any part is to be non-justiciable, the Constitution itself must say so. I have not seen anything in chapter 6 or in the Constitution generally, which tells me that chapter 6 is not justiciable. The evidence to establish the non-justiciability must be internal to the Constitution not otherwise … we cannot add words to the Constitution in order to change its meaning. The very tenor of chapter 6 of the Constitution supports the view that the chapter is justiciable. ... there may be particular provisions in chapter 6 which do not lend themselves to enforcement by a court. The very nature of such a particular provision would rebut the presumption of justiciability in relation to it. In the absence of a demonstration that a particular provision does not lend itself to enforcement by courts, however, the enforcement by this court of the obligations imposed in chapter 6 should be insisted upon and would be a way of deepening our democracy and the liberty under law that it entails...This court will need to be flexible and imaginative in determining how the provisions of the chapter 6 are to be enforceable. There is another point that needs to be highlighted about the pronouncements by The two positions are convergent in that, if a particular provision of chapter 6 does not lend itself for enforcement by action in court, then in our preferred approach, the presumption of justiciability would be rebutted; while, similarly, the case by case approach of Bamford-Addo would result in the court finding that the provision in question does not create an enforceable right. The advantage of the presumption of justiciability is that it provides a clear starting rule that is supportive of the enforcement of fundamental human rights.
Therefore, it is clear that the question of the constitutional status of Directive
Principles is no longer uncertain, and that certain categories of constitutional issues may be resolved as a matter of legislative or executive discretion. This is why the political question remains relevant and part of Ghanaian law.
Conclusion
From the foregoing analysis, it is clear that the holding by the Supreme Court in Ghana Bar Association that the political question doctrine is applicable to the Constitution of Ghana has never been overruled. 
